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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-THE
SUPREME COURT LIMITS THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut,I the
Supreme Court has consistently enlarged the privacy rights of individuals based on the penumbral protections of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, ninth and 'fourteenth amendments to the Unted States
Constitution. 2 Although no individual right to privacy is expressly
found in the Constitution, 3 the Court has repeatedly recognized an
individual's right to make choices regarding intimate aspects of
4
one's own life in the area of sexual expression.
Society's moral views concerning sexual permissiveness have
arguably become more liberal.5 Sexual permissiveness is commonly
regarded as an essential freedom. 6 The Supreme Court's trend of
expanding the penumbra of individual privacy rights has been consistent with the liberalization of society's morals concerning sexual
freedom. In Bowers v. Hardwick,7 however, the Supreme Court severely restricted the individual's right to privacy in holding that the
Georgia sodomy statute 8 was constitutional as applied to
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(the right to privacy encompassed an individual's right to use
contraceptives). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
2 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. The right to privacy identified in Griswold was later
expanded in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); and Gary v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra
notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
4 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decreaseof Passion in CriminalLaw, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 861, 873 (1975); Annotation, Consent as Defense in Prosecutionfor Sodomy,
58 A.L.R. 3D 636, 640 (1974).
6 See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); W.
(1973); L. TRIBE,AMERICAN CONSTI-

BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
TUTIONAL LAW

(1978).

106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986).
8 The Georgia statute provides, in pertinent part: "A person commits the offense of
7
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homosexuals. 9

By narrowly interpreting the right to privacy, the Bowers Court
reversed the prior trend of expanding individual privacy rights. The
Court also undermined the legitimacy of its prior decisions which
recognized the value of an individual's independence to make certain important decisions regarding sexual expression and the right
to carry out those decisions. 10
This Note examines the right to privacy by analyzing the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. In elucidating the
errors in the majority's reasoning, this Note argues that the right to
privacy should yield an individual right of autonomy concerning
consensual sexual activities. Furthermore, the majority's focus on
an incorrectly stated, narrowly drawn issue confused the rights of
homosexuals concerning sexual fulfillment. Finally, this Note will
suggest the implications that Bowers could pose in the future.
II.

FACTS OF BOWERS

Michael Hardwick was arrested on August 3, 1982 and charged
with violating the Georgia sodomy statute' by committing sodomy
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another... (b) A person convicted of the offense of
sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years .... GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
9 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
10 See infra notes 140-75 and accompanying text.
S1I
See supra note 8. The following state statutes prohibit various forms of private
consensual sodomy: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-64 to -65 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1411 to -1412 (1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (Michie 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800-2 (West 1976); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (West. Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE §§ 27-553 to -554 (Michie 1982); MASS. ANN. LAws, ch.
272, §§ 34-35 (West 1970); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 750.158, .338, .388a, .388b (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.293 -.294 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 566.090
(Vernon 1979); MONT.CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-403, -406 (1978 & Supp. 1983); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 19831984). The following state statutes have been declared unconstitutional by the state
courts: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982)(declared unconstitutional by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th
Cir. 1985)); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.00, .38 (McKinney 1975)(criminal statute invalidated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415
N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1301, 1324 (1973)(criminal statutes invalidated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa.'91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974)(held unconstitutional by the United States District
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in his home with another consenting male adult.1 2 After a hearing,
the District Attorney decided not to pursue the case to the grand
jury because of a lack of evidence.1 3 Hardwick subsequently filed
suit asking the court to declare the Georgia sodomy statute unconstitutional.1 4 Hardwick alleged that he was a practicing homosexual
who regularly engaged in sexual acts, and would continue to do so
in the future. 15 The district court granted the state's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 16 The court ruled that, although
Hardwick did in fact have standing to sue, the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 1 7 foreclosed
8
any constitutional challenge to the statute.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that Hardwick had standing to bring suit.' 9 The appellate court reversed and remanded regarding the constitutional chalCourt for the Northern District of Texas in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex.
1982)). The following state session laws have decriminalized private, consensual sodomy between adult homosexuals: 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1,
1980); 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976); 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch.
121, § 1 (approved June 2, 1971); 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1,
1971); 58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § I (effective April 1, 1973); 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9,
§ 1 (effectiveJan. 1, 1983); 1961 Ill. Laws, pt. 1983, § 11-2 (effectiveJan. 1, 1962); 1976
Ind. Acts. P.L. 148, § 24 (effectiveJuly 1, 1977); Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 520 (effectiveJan.
1, 1978); 1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mar. 1, 1976); 1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38,
§ 328 (effectiveJuly 1, 1978); 1973 N.H. Laws, 532:26 (effective Nov. 1, 1973); 1978 N.J.
Laws, ch. 95, § 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1, 1979); 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8; 1977
N.D. Laws, ch. 122, § I (approved Mar. 19, 1977); 1972 Ohio Laws, 134, § 2 (effective
Jan. 1, 1974); 1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040)(effective Jan. 1, 1972); 1976 S.D.
Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr.1, 1977); 1977 Vt. Laws, No. 51, § 3 (effectiveJuly 1,
1977); 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st exec. Sess., ch. 260 (effectiveJuly 1, 1976); 1976 W. Va.
Acts, ch. 43 (effectiveJune 11, 1976); 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3 (effective May
27, 1977).
12 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842; Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1203 (11th Cir.
1985), reh'g denied, 762 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).
13 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
14 Id. Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of criminalizing consensual sodomy.
The complaint named as defendants Michael Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia;
Lewis Slator, District Attorney for Fulton County; and George Napper, Public Safety
Commissioner of Atlanta. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
15 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, joined in the suit
claiming they desired to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but felt
"chilled and deterred" due to the existence of the statute, coupled with Hardwick's recent arrest. Id. at 2842 n.2.
16 Id. at 2842.
17 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summarily aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)(Virginia
sodomy statute held constitutional).
18 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204-10.
19 Id. at 1204-07. The district court prevously had held that because the Does had
neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from
the enforcement of the statute, they did not have standing.
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lenge to the Georgia sodomy statute. 20 The appellate court held
that the summary affirmance in Commonwealth's Attorney was not dispositive regarding the constitutionality of the statute because doctrinal developments subsequent to Commonwealth's Attorney undermined
21
its precedential value.
The court of appeals found that the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy contravened a fundamental right to engage in private,
consensual sexual activity. 22 The appellate court held that an individual's right to sexual fulfillment via private, consensual acts was
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. The court stated
that "[t]he Constitution prevents the States from unduly interfering
in certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy because
those decisions are essentially private and beyond the legitimate
23
reach of a civilized society."
The court of appeals then determined that upon remand the
state must prove both a compelling interest to regulate such behav24
ior, and that the statute was narrowly drawn to serve that interest.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Georgia sodomy statute violated the fundamental rights of
25
homosexuals.
III.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY

A sharply divided Court 26 reversed the court of appeals and
held that the Georgia statute was constitutional and did not violate
the fundamental rights of homosexuals. 2 7 Justice White stated the
20 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.

21 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208-10. The court of appeals pointed to two decisions:
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977)("T]he court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among
adults" (brackets in original)); and New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1983)("[T]he
Supreme Court was prepared to address the constitutionality of state regulations like
Georgia's sodomy statute but chose to address the issue when presented more directly

in another case.").
22 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
23 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212-13.

24 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843. The Supreme Court first enunciated this test in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
25 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.

26 Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority, and Justices Burger and Powell
filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun filed a vigorous dissent, and was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent, in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
27 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2841.
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question presented as follows: "[W]hether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many states that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." 28
Justice White objected to the court of appeals' view that the line
of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut 29 conferred a right of
privacy aimed at individual autonomy.3 0 Justice White found the
right of privacy to be applicable only to factual situations regarding
family, marriage and procreation.3 1 In voicing his disregard of the
individual autonomy view of the right to privacy, Justice White
stated that "any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the
proposition that any kind of private conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable."3 2 Next, Justice White rejected Hardwick's argument that
there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.3 3
Justice White noted that the fifth and fourteenth amendments had
previously been interpreted to recognize substantive rights.3 4 He
denounced, however, such "substantive due process ' 3 5 and reasserted that certain fundamental liberties are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" 3 6 and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." 3 7 Because laws proscribing sodomy have "ancient
Id. at 2843.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30 Justice White referred to the Court's prior cases construing the right to privacy
and their factual settings: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(child rearing and education); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(contraception); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(abortion).
31 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
28
29

32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. The right to privacy has usually been anchored in the fourteenth amendment,
which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35 See infra notes 283-95 and accompanying text.
36 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (193 7 )(a state statute allowing appeal
by the state in criminal cases for correction of errors of law was held consistent with due
process under the fourteenth amendment).
37 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(opinion of Powell, J.). In Moore, an
East Cleveland housing ordinance defining "family" was unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. AlthoughJustice White tried
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roots,"3 8 justice White reasoned "[i]t is obvious to us that neither of
these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." 39 After engaging in an
historical discussion of the criminal offenses of sodomy, 40 the Court
declined to enlarge the right to privacy and asserted that engaging
41
in sodomitic activities was not a fundamental right.
Next, the majority rejected the respondent's argument based
on Stanley v. Georgia42 that the Constitution protects homosexual
conduct in the privacy of one's home. 43 While recognizing that
Stanley gave special protection to certain conduct that would not be
protected outside the home, the majority in Bowers found Stanley inapplicable because "the decision was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment." 44 Justice White stated that all illegal conduct was not
immunized when occurring within the home, specifying victimless
crimes as an example. 45 The Court analogized homosexual conduct
to other victimless crimes 46 in asserting that allowance of Hardwick's claim would mean "startling] down the road" to recognizing
47
as a fundamental right these other crimes.
The Court then asserted that a presumption of public morality
48
against homosexuality was sufficient to support a criminal statute.
to limit fundamental rights to specific cases, additional language in Moore points to a
different theory: "Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)(Harland, J., concurring)).
38 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Justice White cited Comment, Survey on the'Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 521, 525 (1986).
39 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
40 Justice White further noted:
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original thirteen states when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 states in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy, and today,
24 states and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for
sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.
Id. at 2845.
41 Id. at 2846. The Court reasoned that an expansive view of the determinaton of
fundamental rights "comes nearest to illegitimacy" because it becomes "judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution." Id.
42 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(obscene films, although punishable in public, are allowable in
the privacy of the home).
43 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
44 Id.
45

Id.

In addition to illegal drugs, Justice White used as examples of victimless crimes,
adultery, incest and other sexual crimes occurring at home. Id.
47 Id.
46

48 Id.
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The Court noted that the law continually reflects notions of moral-

ity. 4 9 The state's notion concerning the morality of homosexual
conduct, the Court asserted, should not be declared inadequate to
justify the Georgia sodomy statute. 50 Finally, the Court declined to
respond to Hardwick's constitutional arguments concerning Geor-

gia's sodomy statute based on the ninth amendment, the equal protection clause or the eighth amendment because Hardwick did not

raise these issues below. 5 1
B.

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S CONCURRENCE

Similar to the majority's opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that "there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit

homosexual sodomy." 52 Chief Justice Burger traced the proscriptions against sodomy throughout the history of Western Civilization. 53 He concluded from this evidence that homosexual sodomy is
54
not a fundamental right.

C.

JUSTICE POWELL'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Powell also wrote a separate concurrence. Whilejoining
in the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell doubted the constitution-

ality of the Georgia sodomy statute under an eighth amendment
analysis .55
49 Id.
50 Id.

51 Id. at n.8. See infra notes 53, 197-201 and accompanying text.
52 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
53 Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring). For some proscriptions against sodomy see CODE
TH. 9.7.6 (Roman law); An Act for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery, 1533-34, 25
Hen. VIII, c. 6 (the first English criminal sodomy statute); D. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALrrY IN
THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 70-81 (1975); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215

(a description of sodomy as "a crime not fit to be named" that "the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature"). ChiefJustice Burger also discussed the common
law of England and that of the American colonies. Finally, he noted that Georgia passed
its initial sodomy statute in 1816 and has continued to promulgate such statutes "in one
form or another" since then. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
54 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
55 Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring). The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Two different eighth amendment
arguments could possibly legitimize a homosexual's right to consensual sexual activity
and challenge the Georgia statute. The first argument concerns the status of an individual. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court held that the eighth
amendment barred a conviction because of the defendant's "status" as a drug addict.
Narcotic addiction was "apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily." Id. at 667. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court refused to
include an alcoholic's public drunkenness in Robinson's protection. The majority distinguished the criminalization of public drunkeness from regulating behavior in the privacy
of the home. Id. at 532. In Bowers, Justice Blackmun noted "Homosexual orientation
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Justice Powell noted that the Georgia sodomy statute permits
up to twenty years of imprisonment upon conviction of a sodomitic
act. 56 Justice Powell then measured the punishment for sodomy
against the sentence length for a serious felony such as aggravated
57
battery, finding the penalties of each crime to be comparable. Justice Powell suggested that "a prison sentence for such conductcertainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue." 5 8 Because the eighth amendment issue had not
been raised below, however, Justice Powell concurred with the
majority. 5 9
Justice Powell noted that Hardwick had not been tried, convicted or sentenced for his conduct. 60 He added that the history of
non-enforcement of statutes prohibiting sodomy limited the practi61
cal effect of an eighth amendment argument.
D.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT

Justice Blackmun strongly dissented. 6 2 First, Justice Blackmun
disagreed with the majority's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity" because he found that the Georgia sodomy statute prohibited sodomy regardless of sex.6 3 Furthermore, he inferred that
the legislative purpose behind Georgia's enactment of § 16-6-2 in
1968 was to broaden the applicability of the sodomy proscription to
homosexuals and heterosexuals. 64 Justice Blackmun then conmay well form part of the very fiber of an individual's personality." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at
2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Homosexuality, therefore, has the potential to be
treated as a "status." Consequently, under the Court's analysis in Robinson, criminal
punishment of the status of homosexuality and its concurrent sexual practices may be
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
The second possible eighth amendment argument concerns the correlation between the length of the sentence and the crime committed. In Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits
sentences that are disproportionate to the severity of the crime. In sodomy cases, the
harmfulness of the crimes is negligible compared to other more heinous crimes receiving the same or lesser penalties. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text. For a more
expansive view of an eighth amendment analysis of a homosexual's right to engage in
private, consensual relations, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 553, 567-72 (1976).
56 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
57 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
58 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring).
60 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
61 Id. at n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun immediately discredited
the majority opinion.
68 Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tended that an intrusion on one's right to privacy and individual as65
sociation is independent of any sexual orientation.
Second, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the procedural posture of the case mandated affirmance "if there is any ground on
which respondent may be entitled to relief."'6 6 Justice Blackmun remarked that the majority should have considered the constitutionality of the statute based on the eighth amendment 6 7 and the equal
protection clause. 68 Justice Blackmun emphasized, however, that
the statute abridged Hardwick's constitutional rights to privacy and
freedom of intimate association. 69 Justice Blackmun asserted that
the right to privacy alone was sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of § 16-6-2.70
Justice Blackmun then traced the Court's construction of the
right to privacy. He stated that the Court has recognized a right to
privacy "with reference to certain decisions"71 an individual might
make, and "with reference to certain places without regard for the
particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are
engaged."' 72 Justice Blackmun concluded that Bowers involved both
73
the decisional and locational aspects of the right to privacy.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that "'a complaint should
not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the particular
legal theory he advances', for the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to
determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Id. (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)). See Parr v.
Great Lakes Co., 484 F.2d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1973)("a complaint should not be dismissed merely because its allegations do not support the legal theory on which the
pleader intends to proceed."); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630, 631 (5th
Cir. 1964)("if the complaint alleges facts, which, under any theory of the law, would
entitle the complainant to recover, the action may not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim."); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 1357,
601-02 (1969).
67 See supra note 55.
68 See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
69 Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Blackmun.J., dissenting). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(concerning an individual's decision to have an abortion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925)(concerning the parental decision of guiding their children's education).
72 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850, 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984) ("The monitoring of a beeper in a private residence...
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the
privacy of the residence."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)("The Fourth
Amendment ...prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest."); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)(evidence seized in an unreasonable search, absent probable
cause was excluded from trial where police seized narcotics from passenger in a taxicab).
73 Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65
66
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Justice Blackmun then focused on the rationale behind the decisional right to privacy. He stated:
We protect those [privacy] rights not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because
they form so central a part of an individual's life. [T]he concept of
privacy embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not others nor to society as a whole. 74
Justice Blackmun analyzed why certain rights have been protected
by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 7 5 He reasoned
that behind the personal decisions concerning marriage, 76 procreation, 77 and having a family78 were more basic individual value
choices. Justice Blackmun determined that the effect of each decision on an individual's self-definition was what had really been protected.7 9 Justice Blackmun further noted that many individual
values and decisions are expressed through choice of intimate sexual relationships.8 0
Justice Blackmun then argued that if an individual is free to
choose how to conduct his life, society must accept "the fact that
different individuals will make different choices." 8' Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority, in refusing to further expand the
right to privacy in Bowers, had in actuality refused to allow individual
82
choice in intimate associations with others.
Justice Blackmun next contrasted the decisional privacy right
with the locational privacy right, a right attached to the home, where
"the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance." 8 3 Justice
Blackmun was unconvinced by the majority's conclusion that Stanley
74 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
75 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
77 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 106 S. Ct. at 2188
n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977).
79 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted, "[T]here may be many
'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds." See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
LJ. 624, 637 (1980).
81 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). As an example,Justice Blackmun quoted from a case concerning formal schooling for the Amish: "'There can be no
assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are
'wrong'. A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned because it is different.'" Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
82 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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v. Georgia8 4 was entirely a first amendment case. 85 Justice Blackmun
construed Stanley to hold that a state's "power to punish the public
distribution of constitutionally unprotected, obscene material did
not permit the state to punish the private possession of such material." 8 6 Justice Blackmun declared, moreover, that Stanley concerned
a fourth amendment locational right to individual privacy.8 7 Justice
Blackmun asserted that Stanley's reliance on Olmstead v. United
States,88 a fourth amendment case, advanced Stanley as a fourth
amendment case. 8 9 Justice Blackmun additionally supported his interpretation of Stanley with ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton:90
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected privacy, this
Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the "privacy of the home" which was hardly more than a
reaffirmation that "a man's home is his castle." 9 1
From this conclusion in Paris,Justice Blackmun reasserted that
an individual's right to conduct intimate sexual relations within the
privacy of the home was at "the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy." '9 2 Because both the decisional and locational aspects
of privacy were intertwined in Bowers, Justice Blackmun argued that
private, consensual sexual relations provided a most compelling reason to extend constitutional protection to an individual through the
93
right to privacy.
Having shown the magnitude of the liberty interests involved in
Bowers, Justice Blackmun belittled the majority's justification of
Georgia's infringement upon these interests. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the two main justifications supporting the Georgia sodomy statute-the protection of the state's general health and welfare
and the fact that sodomy had previously been prohibited for a long
period-were insufficient to warrant dismissing Hardwick's chal94
lenge for failure to state a claim.
84 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
85 See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
89 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).

90 413 U.S. 49 (1973)(The right to privacy did not extend to a display of obscene
films in commercial theaters to consenting adult audiences. The state concern of safeguarding against crime and other possible effects of obscenity was held to be a legitimate interest.).
91 Id. at 66.
92
93
94

Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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First, Justice Blackmun declared that the state's interest in promoting "the general public health and welfare" was unsupported. 95
Justice Blackmun noted that the record below did not contain any
evidence supporting the state's claim. 9 6 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun discredited any analogy between private consensual sexual ac97
tivity and the victimless crimes that Stanley refused to protect.
Justice Blackmun reasoned that these victimless crimes-"possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods" 9 8-were not
actually "victimless" because "drugs and weapons are inherently
dangerous, and for property to be 'stolen,' someone must have been
wrongfully deprived of it." 99 Justice Blackmun distinguished
sodomitic activity because "[n]othing in the record before the Court
provides any justification for finding the activity by § 16-6-2 to be
physically dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to
others." 100
Second, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority that
long-standing religious prohibitions are a sufficient reason to permit
Georgia's interference with an individual's right to privacy.' 0 1 Justice Blackmun asserted that the length of time a majority holds its
02
convictions does not bar an issue from constitutional scrutiny.'
Justice Blackmun further reasoned that the majority's invocation of traditional Judeo-Christian prohibitions was misguided.
Although certain religious groups condemn sodomitic behavior,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that these proscriptions did not warrant a state's imposition of morality on its citizens.' 0 3 Justice Blackmun stated:
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For a case concerning the inherent danger of weapons, see McLaughlin v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1677 (1986)(an unloaded hand gun was
termed a dangerous weapon).
100 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further
distinguished between private, consensual sexual conduct and adultery and incest, two
sexual crimes on which the majority relied. Id. at 2854 n.4. Adultery "is likely to injure
third persons," and incest is also harmful because "the nature of familial relationships
renders true consent to incestuous activity sufficiently problematical ...." Id. Justice
Blackmun noted that no harm had been shown to the Court regarding private, consensual sexual activity, on the other hand. Id. at 2854.
101 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(the right
to an abortion was protected); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(miscegenation protected); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(school segregation held
unconstitutional).
103 Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95
96
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A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.
"The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach 1of
the law, but
04
the law cannot directly or indirectly give them effect.'
Next, Justice Blackmun rejected Georgia's justification of § 166-2 as a method of promoting public morality. 10 5 Justice Blackmun
distinguished the protection of public sensibilities from the enforcement of private morality upon individuals.' 0 6 Justice Blackmun also
distinguished the regulation of public sexual activity, a legitimate
state concern, from prohibitions of intimate behavior occurring in
private. 10 7 The interests involved in Bowers, Justice Blackmun reasoned, were private in nature, and a state could not justify "invading
the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their
08
lives differently."'1
Justice Blackmun concluded his dissent with a plea that the majority reconsider its analysis, again urging that "depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of non-con-

formity could ever do."'
E.

09

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent.'10 He approached the
case with a two-part analysis. Justice Stevens questioned whether
§ 16-6-2 applied to all persons. He next queried whether specific
enforcement of the statute against homosexuals was constitutional.
Justice Stevens first discussed the constitutionality of the Georgia
104

Id. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429

(1984)). Justice Blackmun also noted that "mere public intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." Id. See O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)(State may not confine harmless mentally ill patient to "save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different."); U.S. Dep't.
ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.")(emphasis in original).
105 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 2856 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun referred to W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the Court recognized that an individual's values
outweighed the national threat brought on by a refusal to salute the flag. West Virginia
Board of Education overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
110 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sodomy statute as applied to all citizens."'
Justice Stevens noted that the history of the Georgia statute revealed a prohibition of heterosexual as well as homosexual sodomy. 1 12 Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned, the statute should be
scrutinized based on applicability to all persons regardless of their
13
sexual orientation.'
Justice Stevens next noted two propositions of law to aid in the
analysis. Justice Stevens first asserted that a majority's traditional
view of certain conduct as immoral was insufficient to uphold a law
proscribing such conduct. 14 Second, Justice Stevens noted the protection already afforded marital intimacy, even absent procreation,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15
In addition, Justice Stevens stressed the underlying values supporting the right to privacy. 1 6 He noted that individuals have a
fundamental right to make certain life choices that implicate basic
human values. 117 This individual right often meshes with the "legally sanctioned and protected relationship" of marriage." 8 Justice
Stevens found that the combination of the two protected interests
formed an even more powerful right." 9 Justice Stevens stated,
"when individual married couples are isolated from observation by
others, the way in which they voluntarily choose to conduct their
intimate relations is a matter for them-not the state-to
20
decide."1
After reviewing the Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecti111 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens undermined the majority's issue
presented in stating, "In reality, however, it is the indiscriminate prohibition of sodomy,
heterosexual as well as homosexual, that has been present 'for a very long time.' " Id. at
n.2.
113 Id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(miscegenation, once treated as a crime, upheld under the equal protection clause and a due process argument).
115 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
116 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (StevensJ, dissenting).
117 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted his previous opinion in Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 916 (1976): "The character of the Court's language... brings to mind ... the
abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's
right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable."
118 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Georgia Attorney General conceded that § 16-6-2 would be held unconstitutional if applied to a married
couple. Id. at n.10.
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Eisenstadt v. Baird,'2 2 and Carey v. Population Services InternaJustice Stevens concluded that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protects individuals' decisions concerning the intimacies of "nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others
may consider offensive or immoral."' 24 Justice Stevens noted that
the prior case law clearly established that states may not prohibit
private, consensual sodomy between unmarried heterosexual
adults.12 5 Therefore, Justice Stevens pointed out that § 16-6-2 was,
as a whole, unconstitutional because of proscriptions aimed at a
126
protected right.
Justice Stevens then applied the Georgia statute specifically to
homosexuals. Justice Stevens concluded that since the statute was
inapplicable to heterosexuals, either homosexuals "do not have the
same interest in 'liberty' ",127 as others, or the state must show a
compelling interest to support this criminal statute.' 28 Justice Stevens stated, "the State must assume the burden ofjustifying a selective application of its law."' 12 9 Justice Stevens then determined that
every citizen has the same interest in liberty. 130 He further reasoned
that homosexuals and heterosexuals have the same interest in conducting sexual activity.' 3 1 Justice Stevens concluded that the selective application of the Georgia sodomy statute based upon a
homosexual's
differing
interests in liberty was clearly
32
1
unacceptable.
Next, Justice Stevens found no compelling state interest justifying a selective application of § 16-6-2.133 Justice Stevens pointed
out that the majority erred in relying on "'the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.' "134 Justice Stevens elaborated that based
on the statute as written, 13 5 the Georgia electorate reflected the beCUt, 12

1

tional,123

381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
405 U.S. 438 (1972). See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 251-84 and accompanying text.
129 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority's opinion, Bowers, 106 U.S. at
2846).
135 See supra note 8.
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
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lief that all sodomy is immoral, rather than just homosexual
36
sodomy.'Finally, Justice Stevens discussed the non-enforcement of the
Georgia statute. 137 Justice Stevens showed the banality of Georgia's
representation of the importance of the selective application of
§ 16-6-2. He reasoned that the history of non-enforcement of the
anti-sodomy statute points out that no application of the statute is, in
actuality, "important."'13 8 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that
since Georgia did not justify a selective application of § 16-6-2,
Hardwick had asserted a sufficient constitutional claim to withstand
139
a motion to dismiss.
IV.

EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT

To PRIVACY

The word privacy itself is notably absent from the Constitution. 140 The right to privacy, however, has been expressed in many
different forms. Thomas Paine described the natural rights of man
to include "rights ... [of] an individual for his own comfort and
happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of
others."141
Mirroring Paine's idea was John Stuart Mill's "harm" principle.
The government may only exercise power over an individual against
his or her will if necessary to prevent harm to others:
[The] sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their member, is self-protection... [T]he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others ....The only part of the conduct
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence
is, of right, absolute over
himself, over his own body and mind, the
42
individual is sovereign. 1
Warren and Brandeis reiterated Mill's idea of individual auton43
omy absent harm to another in their seminal law review article.'
Warren and Brandeis, although writing in the context of tort principles, recognized a common law protection against the intrusion
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
Comment, The Right of Privacyand OtherConstitutionalChallenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15
U. TOL. L. REv. 811, 825 (1984) (quoting from F. COKER, READING IN POLrICAL PHILOSOPHY 675 (1938)).
142 j. MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (1859).
143 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
136
137
138
139
140
141
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44
upon personal matters.1
The discussion of privacy notions was not limited to philosphers and academics, however. The courts were paramount in the
evolution of the right to privacy. The courts first expressed the
right to privacy in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford. 14 5 Justice Gray
called "the possession and control of [one's] own person" a sacred
individual right, again protected by the common law against undue
14 6
interference by others.
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,14 7 the Supreme Court held that a
state statute prohibiting the teaching of any foreign language cannot
interfere with individual rights unless a "reasonable relation" to a
state interest was shown. 148 The Court held, in weighing the competing interests, that the legislative desire to cultivate homogeneous
14 9
patriotic beliefs did not override the individual's rights.
In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,15 0 Justice Brandeis asserted that "the right to be let alone" is "the most compre15 1
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."'
The right recognized by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead built upon the
common law right he had previously recognized in his law review
article' 5 2 that began developing an individual right to autonomy.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,15 3 the Court, for the first time, used the
due process clause to support the right to privacy.' 5 4 In Skinner, the
Court invalidated a mandatory criminal sterilization statute, holding
55
that the state's invasion of personal liberties violated due process. 1
The right to privacy later received explicit constitutional recognition in Griswold v. Connecticut.15 6 Justice Douglas derived constitutional authority for the right to privacy out of a penumbra of Bill of
Rights protections. 5 7 Although the exact constitutional directive
was lacking, Justice Douglas reasoned that the right to privacy was
still a part of the Constitution. 158 Justice Douglas found, in the first,
144 See id.
145
146
147
148
149

141 U.S. 250 (1891).
Id. at 251.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402-03.

150 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
152 See supra note 143.
'53 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 544-45 (Stone, CJ., concurring).
156 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
157 Id. at 484-85.
158

Id.
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third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, an individual "zone of
privacy."'1 5 9 Justice Douglas, as an incorporationist, asserted that
the fourteenth amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. 160 Rather than finding a separate right to privacy inside the
fourteenth amendment, however, Justice Douglas' right to privacy
sprang from rights already contained in the Bill of Rights. 16 1 The
Court in Griswold specifically held a criminal statute prohibiting the
use and sale of contraceptives unconstitutional. 6 2 Griswold can be
broadly interpreted, however, as invalidating any legislation regulat63
ing marital privacy including the right to engage in sodomy.1
The Court next interpreted the right to privacy in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.1 64 In Eisenstadt, the Court extended Griswold, allowing unmarried individuals the right to use contraceptives. 165 Although Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds, 16 6 the case has often
been cited for the proposition that the right to privacy encompasses
unmarried persons. 16 7 Hence, Griswold's protection of intimacy in
the marital context has been extended to the individual. Therefore,
Eisenstadt shows that unmarried heterosexuals are protected by the
right to privacy concerning private, consensual sexual fulfillment.
Under Eisenstadt, unwarranted governmental intrusion into an individual's private sexual affairs is unconstitutional.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161
162
163

See id. at 484-85.

Id. at 485.

Subsequent to the Griswold decision, a majority of courts have ruled that criminal
sanctions cannot be imposed on married couples for deviant sexual conduct. See Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va.
1969)(dictum); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966)(dictum); State v.
Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 113 Ariz.
107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976)(en banc); State v. Lair, 62 NJ. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973)(dicturn); Mentek v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 799, 238 N.W.2d 752 (1976)(dictum);Jones v. State,
55 Wis.2d 742, 200 N.W.2d 587 (1972)(dictum). But see Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972)(dictum); State v. Schmidt, 273
Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966)(dictum); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1970, appealdismissed,402 U.S. 902 (197 1)(dictum)). See also Richards, Sexual.utonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957 (1979); Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor
PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
164 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
165 Id. at 448-49.
166 See id. at 454-55.
167 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 n.12 (1978); Comment, Choice: PersonalAutonomy and the Right to Privacy,
14 IDAHO L. REV. 447 (1978).
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The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade 168 solidified the constitutional protection of the right to privacy. The Court, through Justice
Blackmun, held that the right to privacy protected an unmarried woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 169 The Court in
Roe reasoned that the right to privacy was based on the fourteenth
amendment's concept of liberty. 170 Roe can be seen as protecting
individual choice regarding an intimate decision involving selffulfillment.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth17 1 the Court once again expanded the right to privacy. The Court held that the right to privacy
extended to minors. In Planned Parenthood, the Court stated that
"[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess Constitutional rights." 7 2 The Court further held that a parental consent requirement for a minor's abortion was unconstitutional. 17 3 This decision reiterated Eisenstadt'steaching that the right
to privacy was inherent in the individual.
Finally, the Court addressed similar issues in Carey v. Population
Services International.174 In Carey, the Court held that a New York
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors was
unconstitutional because it prevented minors from making personal
decisions regarding sexual intimacy.' 75 Thus, prior to the decision
in Bowers, the Court had established a definite protection for an individual right of privacy.
V.

ANALYSIS

The growing controversy concerning the present day fashioning of the right to privacy was not settled by Griswold and its progeny. Prior to Bowers, commentators were far from unanimous
regarding whether to interpet consensual homosexual conduct as
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy.' 76 Lower courts,
too, handed out inconsistent opinions in cases regarding homosexual sexual fulfillment.' 7 7 Bowers, then, was a long-awaited decision
168 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169 Id. at 153.

170 Id.
171
172

173
174
175
176

428 U.S. 52 (1976).

Id. at 74.
Id. at 72-75.
431 U.S. 678 (1977).

Id. at 690-91.

See supra notes 6, 141; Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977). But see Comment, supra note 38.
177 Many lower court decisions held the right to privacy did include individual autonomy in sexual expression. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v.
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that had the potential to conclusively determine a homosexual's
rights. Unfortunately, while attempting to clear up the controversy,
Bowers only confused matters regarding private, consensual homosexual conduct.
A.

THE MAJORITY'S FAULTY DECISION

Justice White framed the issue in Bowers as: "[W]hether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidate the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time."'178 Justice White misconstrued the issue. First, Justice White blatantly revealed his subjective bias when he remarked
that "the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time."' 17 9 Such judicial subjectivity is unnecessary. By slanting the question presented, Justice White discredited his opinion. A biased question presented logically leads to a
biased, subjective opinion. A Supreme Court opinion should strive
to be objective; personal predilections should have no bearing on
constitutional adjudication.
Second, Justice White framed the issue too narrowly. The
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy prohibits all people from engaging in so-called "unnatural" acts. 180 Hardwick challenged the
constitutionality of the entire statute. 18 1 The Court, however, with
minimal explanation, found that the issue only involved homosexual
82
sodomitic activity.'
As a general rule of constitutional adjudication, courts construe
cases and statutes as narrowly as possible. 183 Decisions are based
Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980),

cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47
(1980). But see Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252
S.E.2d 843, appeal dismissed, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
947 (1980); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980).
178 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.

179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). The "unnatural" act of sodomy

is the carnal copulation by human beings with each other against nature, or with a
beast, in which sense it includes the crime against nature. Similarly, it includes bestiality, buggery, cunnilingus, and fellatio. In its narrower sense sodomy is the carnal
copulation between two human beings per anus, or by a human being in any manner with a beast.

CJ.S. Sodomy § l(a) (1953)(footnotes omitted).
181 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
182 See id. at 2843.
183 Note, United States v. Lemons: Limiting ConstitutionalReview in Equal Protection Litiga-
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upon the factual situation of the case at hand, rather than upon hypothetical situations raised by a party.1 8 4 When a party challenges
the constitutionality of a statute by alleging an infringement of an
individual right, the facts of the challenge apply to how the statute
directly affects the litigant himself. 18 5 Thus, although "facial" attacks1 8 6 on the constitutionality of a statute are generally not entertained by courts, there is a notable exception: where a litigant
would impair the constitutional rights of third parties who have no
1 87
effective way to preserve those rights themselves.
The exception applies to the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers.
A married heterosexual couple, John and Mary Doe, were initial
189
party plaintiffs.' 8 8 They were dismissed for lack of standing,
however, because they had not sustained, nor were they in danger of
sustaining, direct injury from enforcement of the statute. 19 0 Furthermore, few, if any, people are likely to challenge anti-sodomy legislation because of the probable "notoriety, embarrassment, and
possible economic ruin" associated with such a challenge. 19 ' A constitutional challenge to an anti-sodomy statute compels an exception to the general rule. Homosexuals should be able to assert the
rights of third party heterosexuals when challenging the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting sodomy. In Bowers, however, Hardwick was not allowed to assert the rights of third parties.
Accordingly, the Bowers majority should have allowed Hardwick to
assert the rights of the married heterosexuals, John and Mary Doe.
If the Georgia sodomy statute had been constitutionally tested
in its entirety, it could have been declared unconstitutional because
of its overbreadth. A statute is overbroad if, while attempting to
control or prevent certain activities, it becomes overinclusive,
tion, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1287, 1291 (1984). See also United States v. National Dairy

Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)(citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22
(1960)).
184 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)(the actual fact situation of a case
"frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues,
but also from premature interpretations of statutes.").
185 See Note, supra note 183, at 1292.
186 Id. A "facial" attack allows a party to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
based on how it might be applied in a hypothetical situation rather than constricting a
court's analysis to a specific factual situation. Id.
187 Id. at 1297. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,446 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). But
see Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 628 (E.D. Va. 1973).
188 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191

Comment, supra note 55, at 565.
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thereby criminalizing previously protected freedoms. 1 9 2 A statute
can be struck down because of overbreadth based on its potential
19 3
adverse effect on non-litigants.
The Georgia sodomy statute, as written, applies evenly to heterosexuals, whether married or unmarried, and homosexuals. Based
on prior Supreme Court decisions, however, the right to privacy
clearly prohibits a state from interfering with a heterosexual's free194
dom of sexual intimacy.
Sodomy is one form of sexual intimacy. Therefore, private,
consensual sodomitic practices performed by married heterosexuals
are constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. Indeed, Georgia conceded that their state sodomy statute, if applied to married
persons, would be an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy under Griswold.19 5 Similarly, based on Eisenstadt's extension of
Griswold to the unmarried individual, such acts performed by unmarried heterosexuals are also constitutionally protected. If an attack
were made on a state statute prohibiting sodomy by either a married
or unmarried heterosexual the statute would not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Where a statute is broadly applicable to consensual sodomitic
activities of married couples and unmarried heterosexuals:
[A] possible tactic, regardless of prosecution based on homosexual or
heterosexual activity, is the bringing of an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the constitutionality of the statute and for an injunction
against its enforcement, having a married heterosexual [or unmarried
heterosexuals] 19
be6 a party, so as to avoid questions of standing to raise
this argument.
The Bowers Court should have enabled the respondent to assert the
rights of third party heterosexuals. If a third party heterosexual's
rights had been considered, the Georgia statute would have been
held unconstitutional because of overbreadth.
The Georgia statute could also be constitutionally attacked on
equal protection grounds because it applied only to homosexuals.' 97 Although an equal protection argument was not raised beState v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974).
Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A Comparative
Analysis, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 253, 273 (1981-82).
194 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
195 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10.
196 Annotation, Consent as Defense in Prosecution for Sodomy, 58 A.L.R. 31 636, 641
(1974). See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded on othergrounds sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
197 For an extensive look at the applicability of the equal protection clause to homo192
193
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low, 198 a statute that inherently discriminates against a certain

group of people, such as homosexuals, violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. 19 9 Without a sufficient compelling interest to justify the unequal application, the Georgia sodomy statute
would be unconstitutional. If a statute prohibited consensual homosexual, but not heterosexual sodomitic activities, the statute would
be inherently discriminatory because it would classify individuals on
the basis of their sexual preference. Therefore, because both case
law200 and a Georgia concession 20 1 point toward the inapplicability
of § 16-6-2 to heterosexuals, the Georgia sodomy statute should
have been held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
B.

INTERPRETING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy, although often discussed, is a mysterious
and amorphous area of protection. The right to privacy has not
been specifically defined by the judiciary. Rather, the right has
evolved on a case-by-case basis.
The issue of whether the right to privacy protects consensual,
private homosexual sodomy was previously before the Court in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 20 2 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that a Virginia statute criminalizing sodomy was constitutional and did not violate an individual's
right to privacy. 20 3 The court reasoned that the state's interest in
promoting morality and decency, coupled with the suppression of
20 4
crime, was an action within the reach of Virginia's police power.
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed without an
opinion. 20 5 Absent an opinion to support the affirmance, the precedential value of Commonwealth's Attorney is unclear. The summary affirmance only legitimizes the outcome of the case; a summary
affirmance does not necessarily mean the Supreme Court is condon20 6
ing the lower court's reasoning.
sexual fulfillment, see Note, Right of Privacy-ConsensualSodomy and the Choice of a Moral
Doctrine: New York's Permissive Position, W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 75, 90-94 (1982-83).
198 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 n.8. But see id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the

procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the Court of Appeals'judgment if
there is any ground on which respondent may be entitled to relief.").
199 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

200 See supra note 194.
201 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
202 425 U.S. 901 (1976), afr'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
203 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
204 Id. at 1202.

205 425 U.S. 901 (1976), af'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
206 Comment, supra note 141, at 840.
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Two years later, in Carey v. Population Services International,20 7
while reaffirming a minor's interest in privacy rights, Justice Brennan noted that the Court "has not definitely answered" the question
of a state's power to regulate private, consensual homosexual relationships. 20 8 Alternatively, Justice Rehnquist asserted that Commonwealth's Attorney had settled the question-states can regulate such
behavior. 20 9 Lower court decisions and commentators were similarly confused about the meaning of the summary affirmance in Com2 10
monwealth 's Attorney.
Bowers answered the questions surrounding the exact view the
Supreme Court would adopt regarding homosexual sodomy. The
majority, in a narrowly written opinion, reviewed the right to privacy
and its applications based on the precise factual patterns of the cases
in which the right had previously been invoked. In this fashion, the
majority interpreted Griswold and its progeny and announced the
right to privacy was strictly based in the context of marriage, the
21
family, and procreation. '
In support of their narrow interpretation of the right to privacy,
both the majority and Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, repeated antiquated proscriptions against sodomy.2 1 2 Chief Justice
Burger's entire concurrence, moreover, did little more than list the
"ancient roots" of the proscriptions against sodomy.2 1 3 After his
historical journey, ChiefJustice Burger concluded that "to hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a funda2 14
mental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."
Chief Justice Burger, in basing his entire concurrence on outdated
laws, rules and teachings, failed to analyze the respondent's claim in
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 694 n.17.
Id. at 718 n.2.
See State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869
(1977)(unmarried consensual sexual activty); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa
1976)(unmarried consensual sexual activity); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d
333 (1977)(fornication); State v. Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1978)(consensual homosexual activity); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415
N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (consensual homosexual activity); In re P., 92 Misc.2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977)(prostitution). But see Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. D.C. 1977)(holding that
discharge of Navy officer because of homosexuality not violative of constitutional right
of privacy since Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney had established that "an individual's right
to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct even where it occurs in private between consenting adults.").
211 Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
212 Id. at 2845 n.5.
213 Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
214 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
207
208
209
210
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a constitutional light. Although both the majority and the ChiefJustice provided interesting historical perspectives, their lack of legal
reasoning and analysis is apparent.
Justice Blackmun pointed to the deficiencies of both opinions in
his dissent. 2 15 He asserted that even though moral judgments are
often "natural and familiar . . . [they] ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." 2 16 Justice Blackmun continued:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it were laid down have vanished long
since, and
2 17
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Although the majority considered the issue from a constitutional perspective, they failed to address the underlying question involved. The issue involved was not whether a homosexual has a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Rather, the actual issue in
Bowers concerned the underlying values linking the privacy cases,
and how these values fit into a particular factual scheme. Justice
Blackmun correctly noted that "this case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court purports to declare . . . [r]ather, this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,'
namely, 'the right to be let alone.' "218
Although the right to privacy developed in Griswold evolved
from the context of the marital relationship, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have expanded that right. 2 19 The right to privacy
has become analogous with the freedom of intimate association.220
The Supreme Court's previous privacy decisions themselves contradict the Bowers majority's notion of a narrow right to privacy.
Eisenstadt freed the right to privacy from the marital context by
expanding the right to use contraceptives to the individual:
It is true that in 6 riswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individId. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
218 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
219 See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
215
216
217

220

See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89

YALE LJ.

624 (1980).
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uals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision
221
whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt, by broadening the right to privacy beyond the marital
bedroom, "served as a foundation for the Court's later widening of
the right to privacy to encompass certain areas of individual decision
22 2
making."
Furthermore, the marital relationship itself can be viewed simply as a form of personal association in which individuals have made
a value-expressive life choice. In Loving v. Virginia,223 Chief Justice
Warren, striking down Virginia's miscegenation statutes, reasoned,
"[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."'2 24 ChiefJustice Warren saw that an individual's stake in pursuing a fulfilling relationship was what the right to privacy protected, rather than the marital relationship per se. The right to
privacy, therefore, is not bounded by the marital relationship.
The right to privacy also extends beyond procreative matters.
In its inception, the right to privacy was used to legitimize the use of
contraceptives. 225 The Bowers majority, however, mistakenly classified the right to privacy as a procreative right. 2 26 The Court's legitimizing the sale and use of contraceptives in Griswold discredits the
Bowers majority's classification of privacy as a procreative right. Roe
further discredits the Bowers majority's notion of privacy as a marital,
procreative right because Roe permitted an unmarried female to
choose to terminate her pregnancy. 2 27 Thus, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe have extended the right to privacy to include a general right
of personal autonomy regardless of marital status or procreative
intention.
Additionally, the recognition of a minor's right to privacy in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth228 directly contradicts the notion of
privacy as a familial right. The right of an unmarried minor to personal autonomy in no way resembles a familial concern. Furthermore, the fact situations contained in Roe, Eisenstadt, and Carey all
221
222
223

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
Note, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REv.
338 U.S. 1 (1967).

224 Id. at 12.
225 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

226 Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
227 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).

228 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

1279, 1286 (1981).
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lack familial relationships. In all of these cases, the right to privacy
was contained in the individual rather than the family.
The teaching of Griswold and its progeny, therefore, goes beyond the narrow constraints used by the majority in Bowers. Contrary to the familial, marital, and procreative interpretations of the
right to privacy, an alternative theory also exists. The right to privacy can be interpreted as a protection of individual autonomy and
"the freedom to choose lifestyles that serve value-expressive functions" 22 9 as long as no harm to others occurs. Underlying all of the
Court's previous privacy decisions is the principle that autonomous
choice has constitutional value.
Judge Merhige, dissenting in Commonwealth's Attorney, expressed
the view that the right to privacy is analogous to individual
autonomy:
I view those cases as standing for the principle that every individual
has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern.... To say...
the right of privacy.., is limited to230matters of marital, home, or family
life is unwarranted under the law.
The freedom to choose, to think, and to act accordingly in an intimate association has been protected by the right to privacy. The
right to privacy broadly encompasses individual autonomy through
sexual expression rather than just the right to purchase contraceptives or have an abortion. The broad language involved in the privacy cases implies a protection of the underlying values that
necessitate the constitutionally protected relationship of marriage,
'23 1
and the decision of "whether or not to beget or bear a child."
Therefore, autonomy in individual decision-making regarding private consensual sexual relationships is protected by the right to
privacy:
The right to privacy was recognized because it is associated with and
intended to facilitate the exercise of autonomy in certain basic kinds of
choices that bear upon the coherent rationality of a person's life plan.
Therefore, the recognition of autonomy is the basis for and basic to
the right to privacy .... Privacy should, then, be extended to protect
the right of the individual, within or without the social 23institutions
of
2
marriage or family, to make basic kinds of life choices.
In Bowers, Justice Blackmun differentiated between two compoWilikinson & White, supra note 163, at 581.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
231 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
232 Comment, supra note 141, at 841 (quoting Richards, supra note 168, at 1006-09).
229
230
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nents of the right to privacy: the decisional aspect of the right 23 3
23 4
(analogous to individual autonomy) and the locational aspect.
Three years after Griswold, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Stanley v. Georgia23 5 that the locational component of the right to
privacy was crucial. In Stanley, the Court held that the individual has
the right to possess and view, in the privacy of his own home, ob23 6
scene materials that would be punishable if in the public domain.
While the majority in Bowers attempted to distinguish Stanley as a
first amendment case, 23 7 Justice Blackmun correctly noted the integral fourth amendment concern:
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us.
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home. The central place that Stanley gives Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment claim, shows that Stanley
rested as much on the Court's
understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the first. 23 8
Stanley was crucial to the development of the right to privacy,
expanding its scope beyond the narrow view of privacy as a purely
marital, familial, and procreative right. Stanley firmly established
that privacy protected the sanctity of an individual's residence-"a
man's home is his castle."' 23 9 The Court confirmed Stanley's fourth
amendment focus in ParisAdult Theatre 1,240 where "the Court suggested that reliance on the Fourth Amendment not only supported
the Court's outcome in Stanley but actually was necessary to it
....
"241
The Court reasoned in Paris that "[i]f obscene material
unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a 'penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not
have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the
'privacy of the home .. .. "242 Additionally, Judge Merhige remarked in Commonwealth's Attorney, "Stanley teaches that socially condemned activity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is
... beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the
233

Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850.

234

Id. at 2851.

394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568.
237 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 ("the decision was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment.").
238 Id. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65.).
239 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
240 Id.
241 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853.
242 ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66.
235

236
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privacy of the home." 24 3
Thus, Stanley proposed that the right to privacy includes intimate relationships occurring in private. When Stanley's locational
privacy component is linked with the component of individual autonomy, a vast privacy right is formed. 24 4 The right to the private,
consensual sexual behavior involved in Bowers hinges on both aspects of the right to privacy and, therefore, a substantial privacy
right encompassing sexual lifestyle choices should be recognized in
this context.
The Bowers majority, along with ChiefJustice Burger, in his concurrence, attempted to limit the right to privacy to certain "fundamental liberties." 24 5 The Bowers Court proposed a test to determine
whether a right was fundamental: unless a right was "implied in the
concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," the Court would not deem the right fundamental. 24 6 The Court concluded that the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy was not fundamental because of ancient proscriptions
2 47
against sodomy.
The right to privacy, when viewed as the right to individual autonomy, still complies with the majority's framework of "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history." The right to privacy, therefore, even if measured by the
majority's narrow standards, is a fundamental right. Privacy in intimate personal decisions has long been considered paramount to the
well-being of individuals. 24 8 Although sodomy itself may not be
rooted in tradition, individual autonomy is. Despite the majority's
topical and narrow question presented, the application of their test
rings true; the right of individual autonomy is both "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and should be declared a fundamental right.
C.

APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO HOMOSEXUAL

SODOMY

A homosexual derives sexual gratification and intimacy in ways
that are proscribed by anti-sodomy statutes. 249 It follows that pri243 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 ( E.D. Va. 1975)(Merhige, J., dissenting).
244 Wilkinson & White, supra note 163, at 590.
245 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844, 2847.
246 Id. at 2844. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
247 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
248 See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
249 See generally G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL (1970).
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vate, consensual relationships between homosexuals should be constitutionally protected because sexual intimacy is a personal life
choice included in the right to privacy. Furthermore, the locational
privacy concerns protected by Stanley enhance a homosexual's constitutional guarantee of privacy. If a person can watch obscene films
for self-gratification within the home, then, logically, a person
should be permitted to engage in other forms of consensual sexual
gratification within a private residence.
Both the decisional and locational aspects of the right to privacy
support a constitutional guarantee of freedom regarding a homosexual's sexual intimacy. If individual autonomy rights constitute
the basis of a constitutional right to privacy, then these same rights
would compel acceptance of an individual's right to choose a sex
partner. In Bowers, the homosexual activity involved was carried on
in private, and involved an intimate life choice. 2 50 The constitutional guarantee of a right to privacy in Bowers is extremely
compelling.
D.

THE BALANCING TEST

The Supreme Court in Roe held that a state may assert a compelling interest and prohibit a person from exercising a personal,
value-expressive decision regardless of the possibility of infringing
on a fundamental right. 2 5' If a homosexual's right to engage in private, consensual sodomy is fundamental, 25 2 the Georgia sodomy
statute must be found unconstitutional unless the state of Georgia
can show a compelling interest to regulate such activity.
A state may attempt to assert a variety of interests in order to
outweigh a homosexual's fundamental right to personal autonomy.
One possible state interest is the preservation of heterosexual marriage as an institution. 253 The regularity of non-enforcement of existing fornication and adultery statutes, however, shows the
hypocrisy of this argument. 254 In his dissent in Doe, Judge Merhige
accurately stated that "to suggest ... that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will in some manner encourage new heterosexual
marriages and prevent the dissolution of existing one's is unworthy
250 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
251 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
252 The assumption that a homosexual does have a fundamental right to engage in
private, consensual sodomy will be carried on throughout the analysis in order to determine the validity of possible state interests.
253 See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va.

1975)(Merhige, J,, dissenting); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 415 N.E.2d 936,
941, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
254 See Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
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of judicial response. 255
A state may also attempt to assert a compelling state interest 25in6
protecting children against sexual offenses by homosexuals.
However, "there is no evidence to support the belief that homosexand some
uals generally tend to be more violent than heterosexuals,
25 7
violent."
less
are
they
that
evidence to suggest
Addtionally, a state may desire to protect public morals. States
can and do legislate morality. 258 A vast difference clearly exists,
however, between legislating public morality and legislating private
morality. Stanley showed that although the state could proscribe obscene material in the public domain, the same obscene material was
permissible if viewed in the privacy of the home and no harm came
to others. 25 9 Thus, while states may regulate morality in the public
domain, they should not attempt to mold individual thought by legislating private morality. A lower court expressed a similar idea:
"the regulation of private morality.., is not an appropriate exercise
of the police power." 2 60 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bonadio,26 ' a
lower court ruled that states could not use their police power to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct did not harm
others.
Moreover, the public's concept of morality changes with time.
Many personal life choices once considered unnatural are now becoming acceptable. 262 State legislatures should recognize the public's changing morality and update antiquated statutory
prohibitions. For example, the present day availability of contraceptives makes it difficult to imagine that only twenty-one years have
passed since Griswold: "such is the pace of constitutional litigation
in this area that Griswold v. Connecticut already seems something of a
grandfather case." 26 3 Ultimately, decriminalization of anti-sodomy
statutes will depend more upon the acceptance of changing morals
264
than upon the recognition of a freedom for individual autonomy.
In Bowers, Georgia asserted the legislation of private morality as
255 Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
256 Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
257 Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
258 See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT Or MORALS (1965).
259 See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
260 State v. Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 220, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (1977).
261 490 Pa. 91, 95-96, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (1980).
262

Richards, UnnaturalActs and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45

FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1289-90 n.44 (1977).
263 Wilkinson & White, supra note 163 at 564.
264 Note, The Right to Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private, Consensual
Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1083-84 (1979).
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a possible compelling interest. 2 65 If a state asserts private morality
as a compelling interest, the state is, in effect, deciding whether or
not an individual right is indeed fundamental. 26 6 By determining
that a majority of legislators' moral views should be thrust upon an
individual regardless of personal tastes, preferences and lifestyle
choices, the Georgia legislature has declared that the state's choice
of morality is paramount to the individual's, regardless of the existence of a compelling interest. However, an individual's right to
make value-expressive life choices in private falls within the zone of
the constitutionally protected right to privacy 2 67 and should not be

overturned by a state's injection of private morality.
A state's most compelling interest in the area of sexual autonomy is the promotion of public health.2 68 The outbreak of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus 2 69 has advanced
this state interest. Georgia's interest in the prevention of AIDS,
however, should not outweigh Hardwick's interest in the freedom of
autonomous choice. Sodomy statutes proscribe certain kinds of sexual behavior and expression. Undoubtedly, AIDS can be transmitted through an act of sodomy; yet, theform of the sexual act does
not transmit AIDS. 27 0 Both "natural" and "unnatural" sexual activity can transmit the disease. In fact, AIDS is rapidly becoming more
71
prevalent in the heterosexual community.2
Certainly, homosexuals are classified as a high risk group to
contract AIDS. 2 72 Evidence indicates, however, that discriminating

against homosexuals by criminalizing their form of sexual expression may actually exacerbate the spread of AIDS rather than de265 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
266 Note, The Constitionality of Laws ForbiddingPrivateHomosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1613, 1636 (1974).
268

See notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
Comment, supra note 38, at 623.

269

See generally Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 41. The AIDS

267

virus neutralizes the body's immune system and allows bacteria or a virus to cause disease. Curan, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current
Status and Future Prospects, 229 Sci. MAG. 1352, 1354 (Sept. 1985). Typical symptoms of

AIDS are fever, weight loss, diarrhea, sore throat, swollen lymph nodes, and other general discomfort. Id. Persons can have AIDS without suffering from the symptoms. Wallis, supra, at 42. These individuals are termed "carriers". Id. Symptomatic AIDS
victims and "carriers" can transmit the disease in many ways: sexual conduct through
the exchange of body fluids; through intravenous drug abuse; through blood transfusions, and by mother to child at birth. Curan, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle,
supra, at 1354.
270 Comment, supra note 141, at 855-56.
271 Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 43.
272

Id. at 41.
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crease it.273 In order to prevent a further spread of AIDS, those
victims already infected must be able to come forward freely to obtain medical diagnosis and treatment. The Georgia sodomy statute
deters such voluntary participation and openness. The fear of being
criminally prosecuted can only deter people from seeking diagnosis
and treatment, and a lack of medical care will lead to furthering the
spread of the disease.
Furthermore, the threat of contracting AIDS may well itself be
more of a deterrence to homosexual conduct than a criminal sanction against it.274 In addition, the social stigma of homosexuality,
supported by legislative discrimination, detracts from the
probability of stable homosexual relationships. 2 75 Therefore, promiscuous relationships may develop to fulfill a homosexual's sexual
needs. Promiscuous relationships increase the chances of contracting and transmitting AIDS because of the increased amount of
intimate contact with different people. 2 76 Perhaps an understanding
and acceptance of homosexuality and its concurrent sexual activity
will help limit the spread of AIDS.
The record in Bowers, however, did not contain any data in support of the state's claim of the prevention of AIDS as a compelling
interest. 277 Justice Blackmun reasoned:
In light of the state of the record, I see no justification for the Court's
attempt to equate the private, consensual sexual activity at issue here
with the "possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods"
to which Stanley refused to extend the protection. None of the behavior so mentioned in Stanley can properly be viewed as "[v]ictimless"
278

Whereas the drugs and weapons asserted by the majority as victimless are in actuality inherently dangerous, 2 79 nothing in the record justifies any physical danger involved in sodomitic acts, whether
to the participants or others. 280 Because no harm has been shown,
Mill's principle 28 ' seems to govern: an individual should be free to
pursue private, consensual intimate relations without governmental
interference.
273

Comment, supra note 141, at 856. See also Richards, supra note 163, at 986 n.127;

Note, supra note 266, at 1632-33.
274 Comment, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality? 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315,
338 (1984).
275 Comment, supra note 38, at 625.
276 Comment, supra note 38, at 625.
277 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
278 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the "connection between the acts prohibited by
§ 16-6-2 and the harms identified ... is a subject of hot dispute
.
"...-282 A threat as new and unexplored as AIDS is insufficient to
support a compelling state interest to override an individual's right
to privacy.
E.

A SHIFT IN SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS

The Supreme Court's modem right to privacy decisions have
their beginnings in the discredited doctrine of substantive due process. 28 3 The doctrine of substantive due process implies that the
Court uses its own notion ofjustice and places this view of morality
into social policy. 284 Substantive due process was invoked to hold
laws unconstitutional because the Court believed that the legislature
had acted unwisely. 28 5 The doctrine can be widely seen as an injection of judicial morality as a basis of the Court's decision making.
The Court first used this doctrine in the economic area.2 8 6
Despite eventually repudiating substantive due process in the
economic sphere, 28 7 the Court relied on the theory in the area of
personal liberties. 288 Griswold has been criticized as a return to the
days of substantive due process: "while eschewing the substantive
due process mode of analysis, he [Justice Douglas] embraced its
28 9
very language."
Additionally, the Roe opinion was said to be a twin of the Lochner
decision because both decisions had strands of substantive due process running through them. 290 Perhaps all of the Warren Court pri282 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
283 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 940

(1973) ("criticism of the Lochner philosophy [substantive due process] has been virtually
universal").
284 See generally GUNTHER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 441-585 (1985).
285 Id.
286 Id. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)(District of Columbia

law prescribing minimum wages for women violated due process); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915)("yellow dog" contract condition that employees not belong to a
union held violative of due process); Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ("There is

no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of a person or the right of free
contract .... ").
287 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)("[a] state is free to adopt

whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare"); West
Coast

Hotel

v. Parrish,

300

U.S. 379

(1937)(state

minimum

wage

law held

constitutional).
288 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 940-41
(1973).
289 Comment, Notes From the Underground: A Substantive Analysis of Summary Adjudication
by the Burger Court: Part II, 19 Hous. L. REV. 831, 849 (1982).
290 Ely, supra note 288, at 940.
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vacy decisions can be grouped together and viewed as a
"superimposition of the Court's own value choices." 29 1 Justice
Douglas and his brethren injected their own views of liberty to override inappropriate state statutes. The Warren Court as a whole,
however, "attempted to defend its decisions in terms of inferences
from values the Constitution marks as special." 29 2 Critics of the autonomy notion of privacy belittle the Warren Court's interpretation
because of its reliance on substantive due process. Yet, query if the
opposition to the autonomy interpretation of privacy stands on firm
constitutional grounds or on their own personal morality.
In Bowers, the majority and Chief Justice Burger, in concurrence, merely manifested their personal disdain towards homosexual conduct. The Bowers majority ignored and misread its own
precedents. By doing so, the Court was simply favoring its own morality over the Warren Court's morality. The Bowers majority engaged in the exact substantive due process analysis that it purported
to shy away from.
The Warren Court used a substantive due process philosophy
29 3
to expand individual liberties in the area of intimate association.
The right to privacy was continually broadened by the Warren
Court based on their view of the values that emanated from the
Constitution. 29 4 The Bowers Court, however, reversed the trend and
attempted to drastically limit the right to privacy. While purporting
to limit "the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal Government, ' 29 5 the Bowers majority engaged in its own form of substantive due process reasoning. In fact,
the Bowers majority's reasoning provides less constitutional support
than Griswold or Roe. Interestingly, the Bowers majority asserted substantive due process in a new light by limiting the right to privacy
and individual autonomy in the area of sexual expression. The Bowers majority has simply injected their own morality in an attempt to
shut the door on the right to privacy.
F.

REPERCUSSIONS OF BOWERS

The Bowers decision will probably have little, if any, effect on
homosexual conduct. A judicial stamp of approval on a legislative
act will not suddenly stop individuals from making value-expressive
life choices. Sodomy statutes are rarely enforced against consenting
291
292
293
294
295

Ely, supra note 288, at 940.
Ely, supra note 288, at 943.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
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adults engaged in private sexual activity. 296 Three factors support a
general non-enforcement of state sodomy statutes. First, police policy generally views sodomitic acts as relatively harmless and not deserving of manpower which could better be utilized to combat more
serious crimes. 2 97 Second, the gathering of constitutionally valid
evidence in sodomy cases is practically impossible. 298 Third, and
most importantly, the infrequent enforcement of sodomy statutes
implies that they do not actually reflect public morality. 2 99 The Bowers decision will therefore have little bearing on homosexual conduct
in the future. By condoning the criminalization of homosexual sodomy, the Court has approved a rule that is impossible to enforce.
The real value of Bowers, therefore, is purely symbolic. This symbolic opinion, however, may give both "police and political leadership a dangerous tool for persecution of selected enemies. ' 00
Bowers must be overruled, and soon.
The resignation of ChiefJustice Burger and the appointment of
Justice Scalia do not appear to shift the Supreme Court's view concerning homosexual sodomy and the right to privacy. A homosexual's right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts may,
however, gain Supreme Court recognition if an anti-sodomy statute
is challenged on alternative grounds. For example, an equal protection challenge appears particularly compelling. Moreover, Justice
Powell's suggestion of eighth amendment protection 0 ' may provide a different avenue to advance a homosexual's right of individual autonomy concerning sexual activity.
The Bowers Court incorrectly interpreted the right to privacy
and reversed the current trend of expanding individual rights in the
area of sexual expression. It seems unlikely that the Court will shift
from its present view that the right to privacy does not encompass
homosexual conduct. Each individual state still burdened by antisodomy legislation should take the initiative to declare its own statutes unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the state legislatures have
been slow to abrogate their proscriptions against sodomy. Perhaps
the greatest opportunity to enhance a homosexual's right to sexual
intimacy lies in an equal protection or eighth amendment challenge
to the existing anti-sodomy statutes. Regardless of the process, it is
296 Comment, supra note 55, at 564-65.
297

298
299
300
301

Comment, supra note 55, at 564-65.
Comment, supra note 55, at 565.
Note, supra note 266, at 1618.
Clark, Courting Disaster, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1986, at 244.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
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time to grant homosexuals the right to engage in consensual, private relations in order to achieve their values of sexual fulfillment.
GARY S. CAPLAN

